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Constitutional Law-Due Process-Use of Illegally Obtained
Evidence in State Courts
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated ....1
Fresh in the minds of the framers of the Fourth Amendment was the
bitter controversy over issuance of "writs of assistance" in the colonies,
prior to the American Revolutionary War. Promulgated by England,
in an effort to restrain colonial trading with her enemieg, these writs
were general search warrants, bearing no particularized description of
places, persons, or things to be searched or seized. Expressions of
opposition to the writs perhaps achieved maximal intensity when James
Otis declared that the writs were "'the worst instrument of arbitrary
power, the most destructive of English liberty and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English law book;' since '2they
placed the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer."
Almost two hundred years later, an incident occurred which could
revive echoes of the impassioned sentiments of James Otis. Municipal
police officers, suspecting that one Irvine was engaged in illegal horserace bookmaking and related offenses, procured a locksmith to fashion
a key that would fit the front door of Irvine's house, and used that key
to gain entrance into Irvine's home while he and his wife were away.
The officers then concealed a microphone in the hallway, bored a hole in
the roof of the house, and strung connecting wires through the hole from
the microphone to a listening post in a nearby garage. Officers were
stationed in relays at the listening post for approximately thirty days.
Twice during that time they re-entered the home to relocate the microphone, first into the bedroom of Irvine and his wife, and then into the
bedroom closet. After obtaining evidence to their satisfaction, the officers, using the same key, re-entered Irvine's home and arrested him.
During the arrest the officers made a search of the house, for which
no warrant had been issued. Irvine's conviction for violating antiU. S. CoNsT. AmEND. IV.

"Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 625 (1886). "This was in February,
1761, in Boston, and the famous debate in which it occurred was perhaps the most
prominent event -which inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to the oppressions
of the mother country. 'Then and there,' said John Adams, 'then and there was
the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain.
Then and there the child Independence was born.'" Ibid.
For more detailed historical discussions of the search and seizure clause, see:
Harno, Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 19 ILL. L. REv. 303
(1925), in which it is stated, at p. 307: "Thus viewed historically the purpose of
the search and seizure clause was to restrain the legalization of unreasonable
searches and seizures ;" and Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seimres, 34 HAXv.
L. REv. 361 (1921).
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gambling laws8 was affirmed on appeal in California, 4 ,and again in the
United States Supreme Court by a divided Court.5
The petitioner, Irvine, argued on appeal that the police officers' testimony admitted during the trial should have been excluded, on the basis
that it was obtained by methods which violated the -Fourteenth Amendment.6 The Court held, however, that in a state prosecution for a state
crime, the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid admission of evidence
so obtained. 7
The manner in which the Court reached this holding does not, by its
own choice, follow a logical sequence of reasoning. The Court admitted
that "'security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police'
is embodied in the concept of due process as found in the Fourteenth
Amendment."" This is saying, in effect, that the protection of the Fourth
Amendment (the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures) is embodied in the concept of due process as found in the
Fourteenth Amendment. Though the protections of the Fourth Amendment are not directly applicable to the states,9 the protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment are.10 In federal courts, evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment is excluded." Therefore, it would
seem to follow that such evidence should also be excluded in state courts.
The major premise and the minor premise are both present in the Court's
reasoning, but it refuses to be bound by this strictly logical conclusion.
Thus, the primary question posed by the Irvine case is: Why will
the Supreme Court not apply to the states a rule of evidence similar to
that applied in the federal courts?
The Court has answered this question in Wolf v. Colorado'2 and
'CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 337a (1), (2), (3) and (4) (Deering, 1949).
"People v. Irvine, 113 Cal. App. 2d 460, 248 P. 2d 502 (1952).
Irvine v. California, 72 Sup. Ct. 381 (1954). A 5-4 decision, Justice Jackson
wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Warren and Justices Minton
and Reed joined; Justice Clark wrote a concurring opinion; and, Justices Black,
Douglas, and Frankfurter wrote dissenting opinions. Justice Burton joined in
Justice Frankfurter's dissent; and Justice Douglas concurred with Justice Black's
dissent.
' "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U. S.
CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
' For its holding in the Irvine case, the Court quoted verbatim the holding in
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949) : "We hold, therefore, that in a prosecution
in a State court for a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the
admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure." Id. at 33.
The principle of the Wolf case was restated also in Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S.
117 (1951). See also Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U. S. 199 (1952).
. Irvine v. California, 74 Sup.-Ct. 381, 383 (1954).
' Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949).
1
U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV.
1338 U. S. 25 (1949).
I Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914).
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again in the Irvine case. It is not denied that the right to be secure in
one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by police is a right to be protected.1 3 This right is embodied in the Fourth Amendment and in the
Due Process Clause. 1 4 However, in determining means of protecting
the right, it becomes evident that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence
is only one of several means, 15 and even though the Supreme Court has
enforced this evidentiary rule in the federal courts, it is unwilling to
condemn as falling below minimal standards of "due process of law"
states' reliance on other means to protect the right. 10 For these reasons,
therefore, the Court, in interpreting its role in supervising administration
of criminal justice in state courts, has concluded that "due process of
law" does not command the Court or the states to exclude illegally obtained evidence in state prosecutions for state crimes.
Four factors which have influenced the Court in this determination
are: (1) the questionable validity of the evidentiary rule of exclusion;
(2) the reluctance of states to adopt similar rules of evidence; (3) the
questionable effectiveness of the rule as a deterrent against illegal
searches and seizures; and (4) the historical interpretation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Each of these factors
will be discussed.
The questionable validity of the evidentiary rule of exclusion. Originating in Boyd v. United StatesT and Weeks v. United States, 8 the
"Id. at 27. Irvine v. California, 74 Sup. Ct. 381, 383 (1954).
"Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S.25, 27-28 (1949).
15 For example, the victim of an illegal search may have an action for damages in tort against the searching officer, the state may dismiss the offending officer
or prosecute him in a criminal proceeding, and the federal government may prosecute the offending officer under Civil Rights Sections of the U. S. Criminal Code.
In this respect, see: Appendix to Irvine v. California, 74 Sup. Ct. 381 (1954);
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S.25, 30-32, note 1 (1949) ; 18 U. S. C. §§ 241 and 242

(1952).

Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S.25, 31 (1949).
' 116 U. S.616 (1886). The rule had its inception in this case, wherein the
Court declared that compulsory production of private hooks and papers is "compelling [the accused] to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, and is the equivalent of a search and seizureand an unreasonable search and seizure-within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 634-635. The Court held therefore that the admission of the evidence was unconstitutional. Id. at 638.
Thus, the Boyd case upset the long established common law principle previously
followed by the Supreme Court, that the "admissibility of evidence is not affected
by the illegality of the means through which the party has been enabled to obtain
the evidence." VIII WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2183, p. 5 (3d ed. 1940).
For discussions of the Boyd case, see: VIII WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2184 (3d ed.
1940) ; Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HAI1v. L. REV. 361 (1921) ;
Ramsey, Acquisiton of Evidence by Search and Seizure, 47 MicH. L. REV. 1137
(1949).
18232 U. S. 383 (1914). Though first stated in the Boyd case, the rule did not
become finalized until the Weeks decision, for in 1904, eighteen years after the Boyd
case, the Supreme Court returned to the old rule, when it held in Adams v. New
York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904), that private papers were not rendered inadmissible
though seized illegally. Ten years later, the Weeks case reaffirmed the doctrine
stated in Boyd, by holding that, in a federal prosecution, where federal officers
16
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federal rule briefly stated is: In a federal prosecution, the Fourth Amendment bars admission of evidence obtained through illegal search and
seizure.19
Authorities have criticized this rule since its inception as being in
direct conflict with a long established rule that "the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means through which the
party has been enabled to obtain the evidence." 20 It is said that rather
than exclude the evidence, other legal remedies should be sought for
correction of illegal methods employed by police, since the question of
the means by which the evidence was obtained is a collateral issue, having
no bearing on the immediate question of the guilt or innocence of the
21
accused.
The rule has also been criticized on constitutional grounds, the main
argument being that since the Fourth Amendment does not explicitly
prohibit admission of evidence obtained in its violation, there is no justi22
fication in the argument that the rule is a mandate by implication.
Many modifications of the rule have developed, 23 and though the
Supreme Court has never expressly embraced opinions of critics, it has
24
applied the rule with care and divided opinion.
have obtained private documents by illegal search and seizure, it is a violation of
the constitutional rights of the defendant not to grant his pre-trial petition for
return of the documents, and that to permit their being held and later admitted as
evidence in the trial is prejudicial error.
For a criticism- of the Weeks case, see VIII WIGMoRE, EvIDENCE, § 2184 (3d ed.
194, Fior discussions of the federal evidentiary rule
of exclusion, see: VIII WicmoiRE, EvDE-TCE, §§ 2184 and 2184a (3d ed. 1940) ; Grant, Constitutional Basis of
the Rule Forbidding the Use of Illegally Seized Evidence, 15 So. CALiF. L. Rav. 60
(1941); Note, 50 COL. L. Rav. 364 (1950); Comment, 42 MIcH. L. Rav. 679
(1944); Comment, 36 YALE L. J. 536 (1927).
" VIII WIGueoE, EviDENcE, § 2183, p. 5 (3d ed. 1940).
21
VIII id. § 2184 at p. 35.
a
VIII id. at 35-40.
29 The rule applies only to federal officers, and a federal prosecutor may make
use of evidence seized illegally by a private detective, Burdeau v. McDowell, 256
U. S. 465 (1921), and by state officers. Feldman v. United States, 322 U. S.487
(1944) ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S.383 (1914). Lower federal courts have
held that one objecting to the evidence must have a proprietary or possessory interest in the seized articles, Steeber v. United States, 198 F. 2d 615, 617 (10th
Cir. 1952) ; Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F. 2d 629 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) ; and the Supreme Court has gone as far as to exclude contraband evidence. United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U. S.48 (1951) ; Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S.20 (1925). In
addition, the pre-trial petition or motion for return of the seized articles, an attached condition in the Weeks holding, is no longer required in order for evidence
to be excluded. Ibid.; Amos v. United States, 255 U. S.313 (1921). Corporations
cannot be compelled to produce originals of corporate records when an indictment
is framed from copies of the original records made illegally by federal officers,
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920); however, a
corporation can be compelled to produce for examination records whose maintenance is required by federal law. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S.
186 (1946). In noting these modifications, no attempt was made to be exhaustive.
For a complete collection of state and federal cases, see VIII WGmORE, EvDmEcE,
§§2183 and 2184 (3d ed. 1940).
",For an analysis of search and seizure cases involving application of the federal
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Reluctance of states to adopt similar rules of evidence. States have
been most reluctant to formulate rules of evidence similar to that propounded in the Weeks case.2 5 Only one state had formulated a similar
rule prior to the Weeks decision, and that state later repudiated its prior
formulation of the rule. Before the Weeks case had been decided, twentysix states had expressly opposed such a rule, and today, approximately
two-thirds of the states still reject it. The influence of this reluctance on
the part of the states is evidenced by the words of Justice Frankfurter, in
the Wolf case: "We cannot brush aside the experience of States which
deem the incidence of such conduct by the police too slight to call for a
deterrent remedy . . . by way of . . overriding the relevant rules of
28
evidence."
The questionable effectiveness of the rule.2 7 There is no way 6f determining whether or not enforcement of the rule acts as a deterrent
against illegal searches and seizures. Surely, many officers conduct
evidentiary rule of exclusion, from 1914 to 1946, see Appendix to Harris v. United
States, 331 U. S. 145 (1946).
Since 1946, the Court has applied the evidentiary rule in these search and seizure
cases: Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 (1948) (seizure of narcotics)
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699 (1948) (seizure of illegal distillery)
McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948) (seizure of "numbers game"
paraphernalia) ; United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48 (1951) (seizure of contraband narcotics).
Since 1946, the Court has refused to apply the evidentiary rule in these search

and seizure cases: Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327. U. S. 186 (1946)

(corporation compelled to produce for examination records required by federal
law to be maintained) ; Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582 (1946) (seizure of
public documents); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 (1949) (search of
automobile) ; United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950) (seizure of forged
overprints on cancelled postage stamps) ; On Lee v. United States, 343 U. S. 747
(1952) (use of concealed chest microphone while engaging suspect in incriminating
conversation).
For a discussion of early modifications of the evidentiary rule made by lower
federal courts, see Comment, 36 YALE L. J. 536 (1927).
"3For a complete analysis of the history of the evidentiary rule of exclusion
among the states, see Appendix to Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949). North
Carolina is listed in this Appendix as rejecting the rule. At that time, N. C, GEN.
STAT. § 15-27 (1943) read: "and no facts discovered by reason of the issuance of
such illegal search warrant shall be competent as evidence in the trial of any
action." The North Carolina Supreme Court, in State v. McGee, 214 N. C. 184, 198
S. E. 616 (1938), construed that portion of the statute as meaning that evidence
obtained by illegal search without any warrant was still admissible. Therefore, in
1951, the North Carolina General Assembly added the following provision to the
statute: "Provided, no facts discovered or evidence obtained without a legal search
warrant in the course of any search, made under conditions requiring the issuance
of a search warrant, shall be competent as evidence in the trial of any action."
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 (1953). It seems, therefore, that North Carolina has
statutorily adopted the evidentiary rule of exclusion. For discussion of the new
provision, see: Note, 32 N. C. L. Ray. 114 (1953); Note, 30 N. C. L. REv. 421
(1952) ; A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1951, 29 N. C. L.
Rxv."Wolf
396 (1951).
v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 31-32 (1949).
"' For discussions of this factor influencing the Court, see: Irvine v. California,
74 Sup. Ct. 381, 385-386 (1954); Id. at 393-394 (dissenting opinion); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 41-46 (1949) (dissenting opinion).

NOTES AND COMMENTS
investigations without knowledge of the illegality of their methods, and
often, too, the question of illegality is for the courts to decide, for the
law of search and seizure is not static. Posed also by the rule is the
problem of whether or not it is wise to free one lawbreaker because he
has been pursued by another. The complexity of this problem is attested
to by the fact that the federal courts distinguish among the pursuing
lawbreakers, to wit: evidence obtained illegally by private persons 28 or
state officers 2 9 is admissible, whereas the same evidence is inadmissible
if procured by a federal officer.3 0 This latter practice strikes at the very
core of arguments favoring the rule, for if the rule is really to serve as
a protection of the constitutional right to be secure against illegal searches
and seizures, why should the courts distinguish among persons obtaining
the evidence? Furthermore, the only person protected by the rule is the
lawbreaker, as it is impossible for the rule to reach the situation of the
innocent victim of illegal searches and seizures.
That these and other evidences of the questionable effectiveness of
the rule have influenced the reasoning of the Court is most apparent in
both the Irvine and Wolf decisions, particularly in its condoning states'
reliance on remedies other than an evidentiary rule of exclusion, in their
efforts to protect constitutional rights.
The historicalinterpretationof the Due Process Clause. Embedded
in the historical interpretation of the Due Process Clause are two basic
propositions: (1) that fundamental to a federal system is the right of
the states to determine the course of procedure to be followed by their
courts in administering justice ;31 and (2) that the Bill of Rights (first
eight Amendments) as such is not applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth'Amendment. 3 2 The states are not absolutely free, but they
"8See note 23 supra
" See note 23 supra.
"' See note 23 supra.
"' Irvine v. California, 74 Sup. Ct. 381, 384 (1954) ; Rochin v. California, 342
U. S. 165, 168 (1952) ; Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949) ; Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 52-53 (1947) ; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937) ;
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908); Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516
(1884); Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 (1877).
"Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 26 (1949) ; Adamson v. California, 332 U. S.
46 (1947) ; Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942) ; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S.
319 (1937) ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908) ; Hurtado v. California,
110 U. 8. 516 (1884) ; Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U. S. 1833).
Justice Black is a strong proponent of the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted for the purpose of making the Bill of Rights applicable to the
states. For an extensive outline of the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, see his dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 68 (1947)
and Appendix thereto, in which he states: "In my judgment that history conclusively demonstrates that the language of the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment, taken as a whole, was thought by those responsible for its submission
to the people, and by those who opposed its submission, sufficiently explicit to
guarantee that thereafter no state could deprive its citizens of the privileges and
protections of the Bill of Rights." Id. at 74-75. For other discussions of this
position, see: Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 114 (1908) (dissenting opinion); Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 538 (1884) (dissenting opinion)
FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

94 (1908).
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may abridge any privilege or immunity not deemed inherent in national
citizenship. 33 And the Supreme Court has been hesitant in delineating
such privileges and immunities, preserving from state encroachment only
those regarded as the life-blood of liberty and justice-those without
which neither liberty nor justice would exist.8 4 When the Court has
ruled that constitutional rights have been abridged by states in denial
of due process,3 5 it has so ruled not because the rights may have been
enumerated in the Bill of Rights, but because the rights have been interpreted to be implicit in the concept of "due process of law."8a0
Starting with a proposition that the Due Process Clause exacts from
the states all that is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"3 7 the
Court's method of interpreting the clause has been a "gradual process of
inclusion and exclusion," 38 predicated not upon a mechanical standard,
but upon a philosophy of empiricism-judging each case as it is presented
for decision in view of what has preceded it and what can be anticipated
a
to follow it.
9

Thus, the Due Process Clause has not been interpreted to demand
of the states the same that the Constitution and Bill of Rights have been
interpreted to demand of the federal government; but, rather, has been
interpreted as a functional element in determining a proper balance between national and state power. Cognizant of this background, the
present Court is naturally reluctant to enforce a judicially created federal
rule of evidence upon the states.
The four factors discussed are steeped in over a century of judicial
history, and their study is essential to an understanding of the conclusion reached by the Court in the Irvine case-that "due process of law"
does not command exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in state prosecutions for state crimes.
Important in determining the significance of the Irvine case is a
consideration of its relation to two preceding search-and-seizure cases
arising from state courts, namely: Rochin v. California04 and Wolf v'.
"Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 52-53 (1947).
" Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 326 (1937).
"Right of peaceable assembly-Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937);
freedom of speech-De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (1937) ; freedom of pressGrosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936) ; freedom of religionHamilton v. Regents of University of California, 293 U. S. 245 (1934) ; right of
accused
to benefit of counsel-Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932).
30
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 99 (1908).
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937).
"Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104 (1877).
Irvine v. California, 74 Sup. Ct. 381, 391 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
,0342 U. S. 165 (1952). Rochin -was convicted for violating state laws forbidding
possession of morphine. Three deputy sheriffs, having received information that
Rochin was selling narcotics, entered Rochin's home and forced their way into his
bedroom, where Rochin was sitting on a bed. Two capsules of morphine were
lying on a table beside the bed; upon seeing the officers, Rochin swallowed the
capsules. The officers jumped him and tried unavailingly to extract them. Rochin
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Colorado.
Each of the three cases, Irvine, Rochin, and Wolf, involved two fact
situations relating to actions of police officers: (1) unlawful breaking
and entering, and (2) illegal search and seizure. Additional in the
Rochi case was the element of unlawful assault and battery upon the
accused. Whereas the Rochin conviction was reversed, the Irvine and
Wolf convictions were affirmed. Thus, the distinguishing feature among
the three cases, which led to a decision in Rochin contrary to that in
Irvine and Wolf was the element of coercion in the Rochin case-"coercion... applied by a physical assault... to compel submission to the
use of a stomach pump. '42 The Rochin case held, not that the conviction
should be reversed because the court below admitted evidence obtained
by illegal search and seizure (the Court never discussed this aspect of
the case), but rather that Rochin's conviction had "been obtained by
methods that offend the Due Process Clause. '43 The Irvine and Wolf
cases held, however, that the Due Process Clause (the actual language
of the Court was "Fourteenth Amendment") does not forbid admission
of illegally obtained evidence in state prosecutions for state crimes. Thus,
in the three illegal search-and-seizure cases, the Court, under the Fourteenth Amendment, has reached the same result in Irvine and Wolf and
a contrary result in Rochin.
. An interesting statement in the Irvine case is: "We adere to Wolf
as stating the law of search-and-seizure cases and decline to introduce
vague and subjective distinctions. ' 44 One page earlier in the same
was handcuffed and taken to a hospital, where a doctor forced an emetic solution
through a tube into his stomach, causing him to vomit. In the vomited matter

were found the two capsules, which were admitted in evidence at Rochin's trial,
over his objection. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that it
was obtained by methods that offend the Due Process Clause.

In the present case, Irvine urged the Court to adopt the holding in the Rochin

case. But the Court refused, on the ground that the Irzine case lacked the element
of physical assault, found in the Rochin case. Irvine v. California, 74 Sup. Ct.

381, 383 (1954).

For discussions of the Rochin case, see Note, 30 N. C. L. REV.

287 (1952), and Comment, 50 MIisc. L. REV. 1367 (1952).
" 338 U. S.25 (1949). Wolf, a doctor, was convicted of conspiring with others
to commit abortions. A deputy sheriff and other police officers went to Wolf's
office, searched his appointment book for names of patients, and interrogated these
patients to obtain evidence sufficient to bring him to trial. Wolf objected to the
admission of the books and testimony in evidence as a violation of his rights under

the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.

Petitioner Irvine argued that, although the Court had upheld Wolf's conviction,
his conviction should be reversed, on the ground that the invasion of privacy was
more offensive than that involved in the Wolf case. The gist of such an argument
is this: Where a case involves invasion of privacy producing only mild shock, the

Court should affirm the conviction; but where the invasion is more serious, the
Court should reverse. In answer to this argument, the Court stated that the Wolf
case and the Irvine case involved personal invasion of approximately the same
degree, and refused to adopt that criterion for delineation. Irvine v. California, 74
Sup. Ct. 381, 383-384 (1954).
'DId. at 383.
" Rochin v. California, 342 U. S.165, 174 (1952).
"Irvine v. California, 74 Sup. Ct. 381, 384 (1954).
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decision it is stated: "Although Rochin raised the search-and-seizure
question, this Court studiously avoided it and never once mentioned the
Wolf case. Obviously, it thought that illegal search and seizure alone
did not call for reversal. '45 What distinctions are being made in deciding
search-and-seizure cases, if not subjective?
That question is answered by the speculation that the Court is caught
in obvious contradiction, for it appears that, despite its statements to
the contrary, the Court has introduced subjective distinctions, as evidenced by the fact that degree of offensiveness of police misconduct
would seem to be the only criterion upon which the three cases turned.
If this be true, then the Irvine case indicates two conclusions as regards
future illegal search-and-seizure cases: (1) if police misconduct involves
physical assault or worse, the Court will follow the Rochii approach;
whereas (2), if police misconduct involves less than physical assault, the
Court will follow the Irvine and Wolf approach.48 Perhaps the Irvine
case indicates a trend back to the Wolf line of reasoning in all searchand-seizure cases, but this cannot be certain, for the Court did not overrule or even criticize Rochin in the Irvine case. Whether the Court
admits it, a line appears to have been drawn, but it remains to be seen
if the Court will follow it.
It seems that the Court has not satisfactorily determined its role in
supervising administration of criminal justice in the states. It has not
been successful in avoiding introduction of subjective distinctions into
the illegal search-and-seizure cases, despite its claims to the contrary.
State courts can know only two things: (1) that the Supreme Court
will not reverse a conviction simply because illegally obtained evidence
was admitted in a state prosecution for a state crime; and (2) that the
Supreme Court probably will reverse a conviction parallelling the Rociin
45 Id. at 383.
4'

This conclusion is substantiated by the views of the majority of the Court

only (Chief justice Warren and Justices Clark, Jackson, Minton and Reed). Justice Douglas, however, would reverse all convictions where constitutional rights
have been violated, on the basis of his beliefs that the Bill of Rights should be a
limitation upon the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the federal
evidentiary rule should be enforced upon the states. justice Black agrees with
justice Douglas, except that he would not enforce the evidentiary rule upon the
states (thus his dissent in rview on Fifth Amendment grounds, but his concurrence
with the majority in Wolf where there were no Fifth Amendment overtones).
It could be said that Justice Frankfurter will reverse a conviction that offends
his concept of "due process of law.'" (He wrote the majority opinion in Rochin
and a dissent in Irvine, on the basis that the convictions had been obtained by
methods which offend "due process of law.") Thus it is difficult to determine
upon what basis he distinguishes the Irvine case from the Wolf case (he wrote
the majority opinion in Wolf), for it was the opinion of the majority in Irvine
that those two cases involved police misconduct offensive in the same respect, if
not in the same degree. Quaere: Has Justice Frankfurter changed his position in
cases paralleling Wolf? He answered negatively in Irvine, but his explanation
did not satisfactorily dispose of the question. Justice Burton joined with Justice
Frankfurter in all three cases.
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case. The greatest difficulty presented by the cases, however, is in justifying the subjective distinctions to the citizens of the United States.
Why is physical assault any more violative of "due process of law," or
antithetical to a concept of ordered liberty, or shocking to the conscience,
or offensive of canons of decency and fairness, or restrictive of fundamental principles of liberty and justice, or offensive to human dignity,
or brutal, than surreptitiously breaking and entering a private home,
installing a microphone in a bedroom, boring a hole through the roof,
connecting the microphone with a receiver, and listening to private conversations for approximately thirty days? That question the Supreme
Court has not answered.
In place of "writs of assistance," or general search warrants, today
we frequently have no warrants at all. Certainly the liberty of every
man is not "in the hands of every petty officer," but it could be said
that the liberty of Irvine was in the hands of the California police. True,
Irvine was a criminal. But he was also a citizen of the United States.
At his trial, "due process of law" could not command exclusion of incriminating evidence obtained by an unscrupulous intrusion of his
privacy.
It seems that distant echoes of the words of James Otis can still be
heard.
J. THaoMAS MANN
Constitutional Law-Special Privileges and EmolumentsRace Track Franchise
In State v. Felton' the accused consented to become the test defendant, was arrested on August 29, 1953, and tried on a bill of information alleging that he "did unlawfully and wilfully place wagers and
bets on a game of chance, to-wit: dog races conducted by the CarolinaVirginia Racing Association, Inc."2 Judge Hubbard allowed defendant's
motion to quash the bill of information for that by reason of the Currituck Act of 1949,3 the bill failed to charge the commission of any crime.
In so doing, the judge held the Act constitutional. That Act provided
for a County Racing Commission which was authorized to grant a
franchise to a person for the purpose of racing horses, dogs, or both
horses and dogs.4 "Pari-Mutuel Machines or Appliances" 5 were permitted, provided the qualified voters of Currituck County ratified the
1 239 N. C. 575, 80 S. E. 2d 625 (1954).
2

State v. Felton, 239 N. C. 575, 577, 80 S. E. 2d 625, 627 (1954).

'N. C. SEss. LAws 1949, c. 541.
' N. C. SEss. LAWS 1949, c. 541, § 2.

* "...
a pari-mutuel system is well recognized as a system having no other
purpose that that of providing the facilities . . . for placing bets ....
whereby
participants bet on the outcome of the races." State v. Felton, 239 N. C. 575, 582,
80 S. E. 2d 625, 630 (1954).

